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Agricultural Workers and the Effects of NAFTA: Uncivil Government Mentalities

This paper will explore the economic and political structures that have stimulated the
migration of Mexican agricultural workers to the United States and to the cities of Mexico. This
analysis is part of a larger study that I wrote on U.S.-Mexico trade. The period of analysis ranges
from 1990 to 2013. It is argued that the agricultural policies contained in the North American
Free Trade Agreement, eventually, led to the financial ruin of small-scale farmers and,
prompted greater levels of unemployment in the rural regions of Mexico. Based on data from
the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), it is estimated that approximately
three million or more people whose primary occupation was agriculture lost their source of
livelihood following NAFTA.
Theoretically, this paper argues that uncivil government policies were instituted which
prompted the unemployment of Mexican agricultural workers. The Mexican government
adopted neoliberal policies in the market place to push inefficient subsistent farmers out of the
agricultural industry. The long-term plan was to move the displaced farmers into
manufacturing occupations. These plan failed, as the Mexican government was unable to
develop sufficient manufacturing jobs to incorporate the displaced agricultural workers. Many
unemployed farmers sought economic relief in the United States, and were incorporated within
the U.S. labor market. This paper concludes that the Mexican government’s macro-structural
agricultural plan has callously caused the social suffering of millions of people.
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I. NAFTA and The Agricultural Structural Reforms
I begin with a brief description of NAFTA and the agricultural structural reforms that
followed. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a trade accord enacted
January 1, 1994 between Mexico, the United States and Canada. Its purpose was to promote
free trade and eliminate all tariffs within 15 years.
When the talks began. NAFTA negotiations between Mexico and the United States
began in 1990, but were stalled after U.S. President George H. W. Bush required that Mexico
privatize the oil industry before he signed the agreement. The Mexican Congress refused to
negotiate, unless the oil conditionality proposal was dropped from the talks. President Raúl
Salinas de Gortari supported the request, but acquiesced to congressional rule.
Once U.S. negotiators reluctantly conceded to the Mexican Congress oil stance,
president Salinas, signed the agreement in 1993, and finalized the reforms Mexico had agreed
to. He personally designed Mexico’s agricultural policies (IMF 1994, SM/94/41), as well as other
free market policies that Salinas believed would lead to Mexico’s prosperity. They were part of
Salinas’ neoliberal philosophy-in which- less government intervention in the economy was
necessary, if Mexican capitalist were to create great fortunes, and then expand employment for
the common folk.
President Salinas’ free market reforms, outside of the agricultural industry, included
reducing regulations placed on businesses in order to reduce operation costs, and accelerating
the privatization of state agencies. Salinas endorsed the neoliberal philosophy that the private
sector could run state firms more efficiently than the government. Under his administration
most state agencies were sold leaving only 215 out of 1,555 agencies owned by Mexico in 1980.

NACCS Proceedings 2015 – Menchaca, Martha

4
Salinas also began the process of eliminating most state regulatory operating business policies,
specifically in the petrochemical and painting industry. Deregulation attracted hundreds of U.S.
investors to establish maquiladora factories in Mexico. At first, President Salinas’ free market
approach appeared to be a monumental success as direct foreign investment increased to
US$67 billion (Chávez 1996: 145). In late 1994, however, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
staff warned President Salinas and the U.S. Treasury that unless the Mexican economy received
a massive infusion of cash Mexico’s financial collapse was imminent, and damaging to the U.S.
economy (GAO 1996). A massive surge in undocumented migration to the United States would
soon follow.
After the Mexican economy collapsed, the rural sector was devastated when Salinas’
plans to restructure the agricultural industry became impossible to implement. I now turn to
why the free market agricultural reforms failed after the collapse.
II. The Agricultural Reforms and Callous State Policies: 1990 to 1995
Before the U.S. government agreed to support NAFTA, President Salinas had to create
free market conditions in Mexico’s agricultural industry. Salinas began to implement policies in
1990. The U.S. government required that Mexico purchase American farm products and not
block the entry of less expensive American food. The U.S. Treasury and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, had informed President Salinas, that the cost of food in Mexico would fall if several
food staples, including corn were purchased from the United States. Purchasing U.S. corn was
particularly important because American farmers produced corn at a significantly lower cost
than Mexico, and corn was Mexico’s main food staple. IMF economists agreed and projected
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that, if corn farmers were removed from the industry, the price of corn would fall by 38 percent
and consumption rise by 18 percent (Larsen 1993: 4).
Salinas’ Plan basically was that inefficient Mexican farmers would be pressured to leave
the industry and when displaced from this occupation, they were to be absorbed within the
manufacturing sector. Central to the plan was to remove most corn farmers.
President Salinas’ vision. For Salinas removing a large percentage of the corn farmers
from the industry was a monumental task since most farmers grew corn (Guerrero 2005).
Salinas and NAFTA representatives knew that removing Mexican farmers from the industry
would shock rural economies, but firmly believed that this was necessary to improve food
production (IMF 1994, SM/94/41). President Salinas’ restructuring plan consisted of three
principle practices: 1) reduce the number of small-scale farmers by ending subsidies and
reforming the ejido system, 2) reward productive farmers, and 3) terminate protective tariffs.
Those who could survive these policies would do so because they were efficient farmers.
I begin my analysis of the infrastructure reforms with a short analysis of the ejidos.
a. Ejidos. President Salinas began the reforms by restructuring Mexico’s communal
land system, which is known as the ejido system. In 1992, the ejido system was terminated
(Harvey 1998: 187). Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was reformed, allowing owners of
communal lands to privatize their property. Since 1917, to ensure ejidatarios had land to grow
crops, the federal government prohibited communal lands to be sold. Salinas’ structural plan
was publically advertised as a policy that would convert the ejidatarios into private property
owners, who would obtain credit by using their property as collateral. Though this was the
rationale, Salinas had undermined their ability to obtain credit.
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Two years earlier Salinas had reformed the banking system and made this improbable
when Bancorural, the government’s agricultural development aid bank, was partially privatized.
Under new private management, credit was limited to farmers with substantial assets (Carton
de Grammont 2000; Guerrero 2005). Farmers were classified under three categories to
determine who was eligible to obtain credit. Small and mid-scale farmers did not qualify
(Carton de Grammont 2000: 73). Only 15 percent of Mexican farmers continued to qualify,
most of which were large-scale farmers. Salinas was trying to rapidly transition Mexico into a
similar system as U.S. agribusiness.
b. Farm subsidies. Next, to further destablize the ejidatarios in 1993 President Salinas
ended most farm subsidies. By 1999, most farmers did not receive any aid.
c. Tariffs. In 1994, when NAFTA took effect, President Salinas’s tariff policies pushed
most non-competitive farmers out of agriculture. Nearly all-agricultural tariffs were removed
that year, and less expensive U.S. and Canadian crops flooded the market (Guerrero 2005: 166).
This was a major setback for farmers since they received little to no financial assistance from
the government to compete with U.S. agribusiness firms.
d. Taxing and privatization. Salinas’ tax and privatization policies also made farming
more expensive and difficult for farmers to earn a profit. For example, in 1992, the government
began to lease federal public waters (streams, rivers), and farmers who could not afford to pay
a fee became less productive or went out of business. Likewise, that same year, the
government sold Fertimax, Mexico’s main fertilizer company and the price of fertilizer rose.
III. What is the size of the displaced agricultural labor force?
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In terms of the total percentage of the workforce the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas
y Geografía (INEGI) concluded that in1970, 40.6 percent of adults age 15 and above reported
agriculture as their main occupation, but by 1997, the percentage had dropped to 20.8 percent
(INEGI 2000: 114), and by 2012 it fell to 13.6 percent (INEGI 2012: 16).
The U.S. Department of Labor and the World Bank offered similar estimates on the
number of displaced workers. The U.S. Department of Agriculture proposed that from 1991 to
2000 the number of Mexicans engaged in agricultural production fell from 4.3 million to 3.4
million (USDA 2004: 6). Likewise, the World Bank estimated that from 1995 to 2003 agricultural
employment shrunk by half (World Bank 2005, vol 2: 119). Mexican government estimates
were even more startling. INEGI found that in 1984, 8 million Mexicans reported agricultural
work as their main occupation, by 2006 the number had dropped to 6 million, and by 2009 to 5
million (INEGI 1984: 9; 2009a: 1310; 2009b: 26).
IV. Did the price of corn decrease?
Now I turn to the question, as to whether NAFTA agricultural policies lowered the
price of corn, as projected by the Mexican government, the U.S. Treasury and the IMF. From
1995 to 2000 the price of corn rose, leading to radical price hikes in Mexico’s main food
commodity-the tortilla. Based on 2009 Mexican congressional hearings, the price of tortillas
had increased by 279 percent, and the price of corn was not projected to return to the preNAFTA prices (Cruz, Cruz and Aguilar 2009: 319; see USDA 2008: 10). Economists disagree why
the cost of corn failed to fall as projected by the IMF and the Mexican government. Some
economists propose that this took place because a Mexican owned firm named GRUMASA
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gradually monopolized the corn industry in Mexico and, without government regulation was
allowed to repeatedly increase prices (Cruz, Cruz and Aguilar 2009: 486).
Other economist project that this was partly due to that U.S. corporations working with
GRUMASA monopolized corn exports and increased the price of corn (Guerrero 2005; Lopez
2007; USDA 2004). For example, CARGIL, a U.S. corporation, owns 40 percent of imported corn
sold to Mexican consumers, and 10 percent of corn produced in Mexican soil (Guerrero 2005:
195). CARGIL sells most of its corn to GRUMASA (USDA 2004: 3).
V. I now ask, Were Mexican Farmers Incorporated in the Manufacturing Sector?
No. To this date, the Mexican government has been unable to produce the needed
manufacturing jobs to employ displaced agricultural workers. Manufacturing employment
continues at the same level as in 1970. In 1970, 24.3 percent of the total workforce was
employed in manufacturing, in 1995, 24.5 percent, and in 2009, 23.2 percent (INEGI 2000,
2009b, 2012).
VI. Where are the displaced farmers and agricultural laborers?
Many are living in the United States. Why? U.S. farmers need the agricultural workers,
which Mexico estimates are around 3 million displaced farm workers. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture estimates that approximately, 86 percent of farm workers who migrated to the
United States in 1996 are undocumented, and 98 percent of those who entered in 2001 and
afterwards (Kandel 2008: 11). These are conservative estimates as the data is based on the
National Agricultural Workers Survey, which only collects data from farm workers who are
permanent legal residents, U.S. citizens, and permanent farm employees.
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In conclusion, the reforms in Mexico’s agricultural industry represent callous state
policies towards poor Mexicans. Excluding the presidency of Vicente Fox, the mentality of past
administrations has been to allow structural economic theory to determine the fate of the
masses. The Mexican federal government’s traditional common sense logic has been- that
those who are displaced from its failed economic plans will find employment some place
because people must eat. In retrospect, Salinas’ agricultural displacement and manufacturing
absorption plan, has somewhat taken place, but not in Mexico. Displaced farmers have found
new employment in the United States, but most have been converted to farm workers. I concur,
with Nicholas DeGenova who in his text the “Deportation Regime” argues that when people are
suffering and are hungry there are no borders (DeGenova 2010).
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